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Abstract 
 
This paper considers how a regional currency basket and the associated divergence 
indicators could be used in official surveillance. Recently, proponents of Asian currency 
baskets have referred to the role the ECU played in constructing exchange rate 
divergence indicators in Europe as evidence of the intrinsic usefulness of currency 
baskets for exchange rate monitoring. We show in this paper a number of problems with 
the use of regional currency-basket based divergence indicators. First, at a technical level, 
such indicators involve tracking regional exchange rates against a moving currency 
basket and can obscure underlying movements in bilateral exchange rates. Second, 
currency baskets generally treat currencies asymmetrically leading to difficulties 
interpreting the derived measures of divergence. Third, intra-regional exchange rate 
monitoring can lead to potentially serious N-1 or anchor problems. Some of these 
difficulties can be addressed by bilateral divergence indicators but means will need to be 
found to anchor regional exchange rate surveillance vis-à-vis currencies outside the 
region.   
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 I. Introduction.  
 
  There has recently been much discussion about the possible introduction of an 
official (virtual1) basket of Asian currencies. The currency basket has been variously 
referred to as an Asian Currency Unit (ACU), an Asian Currency Index (ACI) or an 
Asian Monetary Unit (AMU). The discussion has been carried out largely with reference 
to ASEAN+32 but consideration has also been given to baskets based on wider and 
narrower regional groupings3. Both official regional bodies (such as the Asian 
Development Bank), semi-official research institutes (such as, for example, the Japanese 
Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)) and a number of private 
academic economists have been looking at the usefulness of Asian currency baskets. 
And, most recently, an ASEAN+3 research group has been set up to explore the 
properties of alternative currency baskets. 
  
 Drawing on the experience with the European Currency Unit (ECU) in the 
European Monetary System (EMS), proponents of an Asian currency basket have argued 
that the basket could play two key roles in the context of ASEAN+3. First, the basket 
could provide a framework for specifying exchange rate objectives as part of any formal 
effort to coordinate exchange rate policies. Such an approach would build, in particular, 
on the role the ECU notionally played in specifying exchange rate targets and divergence 
indicators in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS). 
Second, irrespective of whether there is formal agreement on exchange rate polices, the 
creation of an official currency basket could usefully catalyze the private sector into 
denominating financial assets in the basket along the lines the official ECU4 played in 
European Monetary System (EMS). Within the region, this has become known 
                                                 
1 By the basket being virtual is intended to mean that it would have no physical manifestation. 
2 The ASEAN+3 comprises the ten ASEAN countries together with China, Korea and Japan. 
3 Wider currency baskets include baskets consisting of the currencies of Hong Kong and Taiwan 
in addition to the ASEAN+3 currencies while a number of narrower baskets have been 
considered, particularly in the context of convertible currencies. 
4 Based on the experience with the ECU, the view among currency-basket proponents appears to 
be that once the official sector introduces an official ACU there would be private sector interest in 
denominating assets and liabilities in the basket.  
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 (somewhat misleadingly5) as the parallel currency proposal (Eichengreen (2006)) and as 
leading (potentially) to the emergence of the ACU as a parallel currency alongside 
national currencies. 
 
These two roles for an Asian currency basket have not gone unchallenged. A 
number of papers have questioned whether it would be desirable or feasible in the 
foreseeable future for the relatively diverse thirteen ASEAN+3 countries to formally 
coordinate their monetary/exchange rate policies. The relevant questions here have 
frequently been cast in terms of whether ASEAN+3 (or other groupings) constitute an 
Optimum Currency Area6. And, drawing on the experience with official and private 
ECUs—in which special factors such as a lack of internationalization of the deutsche 
mark and speculative convergence plays drove the private ECU market— Dammers and 
McCauley (2006) have questioned whether the conditions are in place for a strong private 
sector interest in an Asian currency basket.  
 
Cognizant of concerns about whether the region is ready to formally co-ordinate 
exchange rate policies, some regional currency-basket proponents have argued that a 
regional basket could still play an important role in the official ASEAN+3 surveillance of 
intra regional exchange rates. More specifically, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) has 
argued that the monitoring of regional exchange rate  movements against some 
“appropriately” defined regional currency basket could be helpful for identifying 
divergences in exchange rates and clarifying the policy requirements for seeking to 
achieve greater stability in intra regional exchange rates and/or avoid misalignments7. 
And a number of senior ADB officials have referred to the role the ECU played in 
                                                 
5 As best can be gleaned, the intention (at most) is for the currency basket to serve as a numeraire 
in which the private sector can denominate financial assets. There do not appear to be any plans 
for the basket to be used to be used as a (virtual) medium of exchange. 
6 Chow and Kim (2002) found, using a structural VAR model, the region was dominated by 
domestic rather than common regional shocks; Eichengreen and Bayoumi (1996) argued that the 
region was not ready for monetary union in view of political considerations; while Wyplosz 
(2001) cited the lack of regional institutions as well as the diversity in the stage of economic 
development in East Asia as key factors pointing to the non-viability of a single currency area in 
the near future. 
7 In practice, there is some ambiguity about whether it is the intention to reduce intra-regional 
exchange rate variability or avoid fundamental misalignments in intra-regional exchange rates.  
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 constructing exchange rate divergence indicators as evidence of the intrinsic usefulness 
of an Asian currency basket for surveillance purposes. At the same time, there have been 
suggestions that the creation of an ACU could be a useful first step towards any eventual 
more formal moves toward exchange rate management and, perhaps, in the very long run, 
monetary union.  
 
  The purpose of this paper is to consider how a regional currency basket and the 
associated divergence indicators could be used in official surveillance. A number of 
questions are considered: How much information would divergences of regional 
currencies from the currency basket contain? How much clarity would there be in the 
signals on intra-regional exchange rates emitted by basket-based divergence indicators? 
How would intra-basket exchange rate surveillance take into account movements in 
regional exchange rates vis-à-vis external currencies? And how would regional monetary 
policies/currencies be anchored under such an approach? 
  
 To anticipate our main conclusions: We find that for a number of reasons regional 
currency-basket based divergence indicators are unlikely to be very helpful for exchange 
rate surveillance. At a technical level, the key problems are that such indicators involve 
tracking regional exchange rates against a moving currency basket and can obscure 
underlying movements in bilateral exchange rates. In addition, currency baskets generally 
treat currencies asymmetrically leading to difficulties interpreting the derived measures 
of divergence. More fundamentally, however, the use of a regional currency basket for 
surveillance purposes can lead to potentially serious N-1 or anchor problems8 unless 
means are found to anchor regional monetary/exchange rate policies vis-à-vis currencies 
outside the region. Comparable lessons were learnt in Europe over twenty years ago and 
will need to be addressed by those calling for a regional currency basket approach to 
exchange rate surveillance. 
  
                                                 
8 The problems relate to the fact that any configuration of intra-regional exchange rates can be 
consistent, in principle, with an infinite range of values of the basket in terms of external 
currencies.  
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 The paper is organized as follows. Section II considers the key properties of a general 
Asian currency basket and some alternative measures of exchange rate divergence. 
Section III reviews the recent behavior of a number of hypothetical currency baskets and 
divergence indicators for the ASEAN +3 and illustrates some of the key difficulties 
interpreting them. Section IV considers the behavior of hypothetical currency baskets in 
response to shocks and the circumstances under which the indicators might be useful for 
exchange rate surveillance. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.  
 
II. General properties of an Asian Currency Basket and Divergence Indicators.  
 
An Asian currency basket can be defined as a bundle of specific quantities of 
different Asian currencies. Such a basket can be entirely virtual with no physical 
manifestation or can be reflected in physical form with notes and coins issued. Recent 
discussion has focused on the virtual currency case with the suggestion that the official 
sector create the basket as a potential parallel currency for the region (Eichengreen 
(2006)). There is some ambiguity as to whether the basket would be created by an official 
regional body such as the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or would be launched jointly 
by national authorities in the region. 
 
The value of the Asian currency basket will depend on the amounts of various 
currencies included in the basket9. In principle, the basket could contain fixed quantities 
of currencies or the quantities of  currencies in the basket could be changed continuously 
to hold currency weights in the basket fixed. In what follows, we focus on fixed-quantity 
currency baskets since these have been the ones in the recent regional discussion10. 
                                                 
9 Here, and in what follows, we abstract from any differences in official and private currency 
baskets. 
10 In order to deal with the tendency for strong currencies to dominate these baskets over time, 
fixed-weight baskets typically allow for periodic reviews of weights to avoid the baskets evolving 
into baskets that are excessively dominated by the strong currencies.  
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 Moreover, the ECU was itself a fixed quantity basket albeit with periodic changes in the 
quantities of currencies to avoid the basket becoming dominated by strong currencies11. 
 
The value of a hypothetical fixed-quantity ACU for the ASEAN +3 in terms of, 
say, the U.S. dollar will depend on the amounts of the thirteen ASEAN +3 currencies 
included in the basket and the exchange rates of those currencies with the U.S. dollar as 
given by (1):  
 
(1) S($ /ACU)=                                      Q (J) >0                       Q(J)S($ /J)
J=1
13∑
 
In this equation, the summation runs from unity to thirteen as the ACU includes the 
thirteen currencies of the ASEAN +3, S ($ / J) is the bilateral exchange rate between the 
U.S. dollar and currency J (expressed as the U.S. dollar price of currency J) and Q (J) is 
the (by assumption) positive12 quantity of currency J in the ACU.  
 
By construction, S ($ /ACU) will be homogeneous of degree one in the S ($ / J) 
terms which is a desirable property for a currency basket. The assumption implies that a 
one percent appreciation of all the currencies in the basket will lead to the ACU 
appreciating in terms of the US dollar by (approximately) one percent13. The impact that 
any individual currency will have on the value of the basket will depend, as we note 
below, on its weight in the basket. 
 
                                                 
11 Changes in weights in Europe were typically undertaken is such as way as to avoid jumps in 
the value of the currency basket. The currency basket was also changed from time to time to 
allow for the inclusion of new members in the EMS. 
12 In principle, a currency basket could include negative as well as positive amounts of different 
currencies. In such a case, the basket would be “short” certain currencies and “long” other 
currencies. Such baskets could arise in situations in which the basket is determined on the basis of 
an optimization problem directed, for example, to minimizing or maximizing some objective 
function. 
13 Here, and in what follows, we hold the weights in the basket fixed in considering “small” 
changes in exchange rates. 
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 It is convenient to define the weight of any currency in the basket14. Dividing 
equation (1) through by S ($ /ACU), the weight of any currency J (J=1,...,13) in the ACU 
can be defined as in equation (2) and the sum of the weights will be given by equation 
(3): 
 
(2) Ω(J) =Q(J)S($ /J) /S($ /ACU) =Q(J)S(ACU /J)    
 
(3)                 Ω(J) = Q(J)S(ACU /J) =1
J=1
13∑
J=1
13∑ 0 < Ω(J) <1   
 
Here S(ACU /J) is the ACU price of a unit of currency J. According to equation (2), the 
weight of any currency J in the ACU will depend on how much of it is included in the 
basket multiplied by its ACU price. When the quantities of currencies in the ACU are 
fixed, the weights will vary over time when there are changes in the values of component 
currencies. As noted, relatively strong currencies will see their weights increase and 
conversely for relatively weak currencies15. As can be seen from equation (3), the 
weights of the thirteen currencies in the ACU will sum to unity and each weight will lie 
between zero and unity as the basket is assumed to include positive quantities of 
component currencies.  
  
 In principle, as noted in the next section, a variety of different approaches can be 
taken to selecting the (initial) set of weights in the currency basket. Depending on the 
approach adopted, the basket could have similar or different currency weights and/or be 
dominated by one or more currencies. The weights in the currency basket will have 
important implications for the behavior of the basket and the derived divergence 
indicators.  
  
                                                 
14 We use the term “quantities” to refer to the physical amounts of currencies in the basket and 
“weights” to refer to the shares of currencies in the basket evaluated at a given set of exchange 
rates. This follows the approach taken in the EMS. 
15 Within the EMS there was a tendency for the weights of strong currencies such as the deutsche 
mark to increase over time. Periodic adjustments were made to address this effect. 
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   For several purposes, it is useful to consider the exchange rates between the ACU 
and each of its component currencies. The value of the ACU in terms of any its 
component currencies (say, currency K for K=1,...,13) can be obtained by multiplying 
equation (1) by S (K/ $) to give a set of thirteen equations of the general form: 
 
(4) S(K /ACU) = Q(J)S($ /J)S($ /K)
J=1
13∑ = Q(J)S(K /J)
J=1
13∑                                            
 
In each of these equations, S (K, K) is identically equal to unity (“own” exchange rates 
are equal to one) and S (K, J) = S (J, K) 1− .  
 
 According to equation (4) the currency K price of the ACU will depend on the 
amounts of all the currencies in the basket multiplied by their exchange rates in terms of 
currency K. Unlike equation (1), each of the K=1, 13 equations in (4) will not be 
homogeneous of degree one in exchange rates. Reflecting the fact that each of the 
thirteen currencies is included in the basket, a one percent depreciation of currency K in 
terms of all other currencies will not lead to a one percent depreciation of currency K vis-
à-vis the basket. In fact, from the set of thirteen equations given by (4), it is 
straightforward to show that the ACU exchange rate of currency K in the basket will be 
homogeneous of degree (1- ) in the other currencies in the basket where  is 
the weight of currency K in the basket. This will be a general feature of all currency 
baskets we are considering. In general, the larger is the weight of a currency in the ACU 
the greater will be the impact of movements in that currency on the value of the ACU and 
the smaller will be the movement in the value of that currency relative to the ACU.  
Ω0(K) 0 ( )KΩ
 
 An ACU-based currency basket can be used to construct measures of exchange 
rate divergence. In principle, exchange rate divergence can be considered vis-a-vis 
currencies outside the currency basket (extra regional exchange rates) or between 
currencies in the basket (intra regional exchange rates). As we note below, intra-regional 
exchange rate surveillance will generally need to take into account movements in the 
basket vis-a-vis external currencies.  
8 
  Extra regional exchange rates can be monitored by tracking changes in the ACU 
in terms of extra-regional currencies using equations such as (1). Some benchmark or 
reference rate for the ACU in terms of, say, a basket of external currencies would need to 
be specified and movements in the value of the ACU monitored relative to that 
benchmark. Such an approach could be based on an equation such as (1*) where changes 
in exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar (the external currency16) relative to a benchmark 
can be assessed using the weights in the currency basket evaluated at a given reference 
point (Ω(J)0 ). 
 
(1*)       =  0($ / ) / ($ / )S ACU S ACUΔ
13
0 0
1
( ) ($ / ) / ($ / )
J
J S J S J
=
Ω Δ∑
 
Equation (1*) implies that the impact of any currency on the external value of the basket 
will depend on its weight in the basket. In the case, for example, of a single currency K 
moving uniformly in terms of all other currencies by x percent the basket will move by 
 times x. When many currencies are moving, the effects will depend on the weights 
of all the adjusting currencies. 
Ω(K)0
 
 Largely because currency basket arrangements (such as the EMS) did not include 
explicit targets for the currency basket vis-à-vis external currencies, monitoring of the  
external value of the basket was not central to that system’s exchange rate mechanism. 
Moreover, in the case of the EMS, it was not necessary to “track” the value of the ECU in 
terms of external currencies as the system de facto became based on the deutsche mark 
with the external value of the ECU tied down by German monetary policy. In effect, the 
deutsche mark became the Nth currency of the EMS with all other currencies shadowing 
the deutsche mark rather than the ECU (Gros and Thygesen (1998)).  
  
 Currency basket based indicators of intra-regional exchange rate divergence can 
be derived from equations such as given by (4). Such indicators will quantify the extent 
                                                 
16 In principle, the external value of the basket can also be tracked in terms of baskets of external 
currencies. Several recent papers have tracked the external value of a number of hypothetical 
ACUs in terms of a basket of U.S. dollars and euros (see inter alia Ogawa and Shimizu, 2005). 
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 to which individual currencies diverge from the ACU. In constructing such indicators it is 
necessary to specify reference or benchmark rates for each currency in terms of the ACU 
against which currency movements can be monitored. If there are formally agreed 
bilateral exchange rate parities among intra-regional currencies (as in the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS) these would provide “natural” benchmarks17 for assessing 
divergence. In the absence of formal agreement on (bilateral or basket parities) 
benchmarks would need to be selected using, for example, exchange rates in some base 
period when equilibrium was assumed to have held. Alternatively, benchmark bilateral 
rates could be based on independently determined estimates of future equilibrium 
exchange rates.  
 
 Effectively, the intra-regional divergence measure will track the extent to which 
individual currencies “follow” the currency basket; as in the EMS, divergence thresholds 
can be specified when exchange rates diverge by a certain proportion of any maximum 
allowable or desirable deviation. In the case of the EMS, divergence thresholds were set 
at seventy-five percent of the maximum allowable fluctuation in terms of the ECU as a 
means of signaling when policy action was needed. 
  
 Totally differentiating equation (4) for “small” changes and expressing changes in 
proportional change form an (approximate) ACU-based measure of divergence can be 
derived as in equation (5) below. In equation (5), Δ  measures the deviation of currency K 
from a reference value at point t=0 and the weights Ω(J)0  (J= 1, 13) –which are assumed 
fixed—are those at the reference point.  
 
(5) 130 01( / ) / ( / ) ( ( ) ( / ) / ( / )T TJS K ACU S K ACU J S K J S K J=Δ = Ω Δ 0∑ / MAD) 
                                
Here Δ  is equal to zero, ST (K,K) 0( / ) ( / ) ( / )T TS K ACU S K ACU S K ACUΔ = −  and  
                                                 
17 Bilateral parities for each currency can be used to generate reference points in terms of the 
ACU using equations such as given by (4). 
10 
 0( , ) ( , ) ( , )T TS K J S K J S K JΔ = − . The superscript 0 refers to the reference point while T 
is the period for which the divergence indicator is calculated. MAD refers to the 
maximum allowable proportional deviation of each currency relative to the currency 
basket. While the latter was based on allowable movements in bilateral exchange rates 
(relative to bilateral central rates) in the EMS18, it would need in a surveillance exercise 
to be based on soft target or monitoring zones for exchange rates. 
  
 The divergence indicator in equation (5) corresponds (approximately) to the 
divergence indicator used in the EMS19. Effectively the basket-based divergence 
indicator for any currency is the ratio of its actual proportional movement in terms 
of the currency basket relative to its maximum permitted movement vis-vis the 
currency basket. Both because it will be difficult to formally specify maximum 
allowable exchange rate movements in a surveillance exercise and on account of the fact 
that recent work on divergence indicators in the region has tended not to work with the 
MAD term in the denominator of equation (5), we work in what follows in terms of the 
proportional deviation of a currency vis-à-vis the basket as the divergence indicator 
(Equation (6)).  
 
(6) 130 01( / ) / ( / ) ( ) ( / ) / ( / )T TJS K ACU S K ACU J S K J S K J=Δ = Ω Δ 0∑  
 
In equation (6), the divergence indicator is simply the (proportional) divergence of 
currency K in terms of the ACU and is a weighted average of its proportional 
divergences from each other currency in the basket multiplied by the weights in the 
currency basket.  
  
 Three particular features of the divergence indicator (as we have defined it) can 
be noted: (1) In the event of any currency J moving by X % against all other currencies, 
                                                 
18 Note than in the EMS, the maximum allowable movements in currencies vis-a-vis the ECU was 
based on maximum allowable movements in bilateral rates. 
19 In practice, as we note in the next section, the indicators in the EMS were based on logarithmic 
first differences being used to approximate proportional changes. 
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 the divergence indicator for that currency will equal (1 - Ω (J)0) times X % and, from 
equation (1*) above, the currency will move the currency basket by Ω(J)0  times X 
percent. Accordingly, in the single errant currency case, the sum of the currency’s 
divergence indicator and its basket-moving effects will sum to 1 times the X percentage 
movement in the currency; (2) the divergence indicators for all currencies will have the 
same weights applied all other currencies in the basket thus exhibiting a degree of 
commonality; in short, currency H will be as important for currency J as it is for currency 
K in the divergence indicator; and (3), except in the special case when all weights are 
equal and proportional changes are approximated by logarithmic differences, the 
divergence indicators for currencies in the basket will not sum to zero. 
   
 Divergence indicators given by equation (6) can be computed and displayed 
graphically. A chart can be drawn with negative and positive exchange rate divergences 
on the vertical axis and time periods along the horizontal. The divergence measure for 
each currency can be plotted with movements relative to the zero line (when currencies 
are at their reference values) indicating the extent to which a currency is diverging from 
the ACU. In addition, trigger points related, for example, to when currencies move by 
more than a certain amount in relation to the currency basket can be drawn in the 
diagram. These could represent early warning indicators. 
 
 In the case of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS, divergence indicators 
were seen, in principle, as providing a reference point for considering the policy 
requirements for fostering exchange rate convergence. Formally, intervention 
responsibilities in the system were to be shared between “strong” and “weak” currency 
countries. In practice, however, as been widely noted, the system did not operate this way 
and evolved into a de facto deutsche mark zone in which currencies shadowed the 
deutsche mark and Germany played the Nth country role (Gros and Thygesen (1998)). 
Not only did this serve to “harden” the system given Germany’s strong monetary policy 
but it also addressed the problem that the formal system lacked a clear nominal anchor 
for monetary policy. With all currencies in the system tracking the deutsche mark and the 
deutsche mark floating against external currencies such as the U.S. dollar and the 
12 
 Japanese yen, both the internal and external value of the ECU currency basket were tied 
down. 
  
 Notwithstanding a number of attractive features, there are three technical 
difficulties with the use of the basket-based divergence indicators for monitoring intra-
regional exchange rate movements. These difficulties were noted very early on when the 
ECU basket-based divergence indicators were used in the EMS20. 
  
 First, the basket-based indicator will not always signal large changes in the 
bilateral exchange rates of currencies included in the basket21. The reason for this is 
that the divergence indicator is a weighted average of one currency’s movement against 
all other currencies in the basket and there can be offsetting effects. In short, the 
divergence indicator only measures deviations from (weighted) average behavior. The 
divergence indicator will tend to transmit the clearest signals about intra-regional 
exchange rate movements when there is a single, small “errant” currency in the 
basket that is either relatively strong or relatively weak vis-à-vis all other currencies 
in the basket. In these circumstances, the errant currency will stand out and show a value 
for its deviation indicator that is different in size and sign from all other currencies in the 
basket. Counter intuitively perhaps—but reflecting the fact those currencies with large 
weights can move the basket by large amount—a single errant currency with a large 
weight will move the divergence indicators for all currencies by non-trivial amounts. 
Only in the limiting case where the weight of an errant currency is very close to zero will 
it be the only currency to show a meaningful divergence from the basket22 (See equation 
                                                 
20 In addition to the difficulties noted in the text, the EMS has additional difficulties related to the 
fact that not all currencies in the ECU were in the exchange rate mechanism at all times and the 
permissible range of bilateral exchange rate changes differed between currencies in the narrow 
and wide bands of the exchange rate mechanism of the EMS. Further, intra marginal intervention 
within the exchange rate band reduced the signaling role of the divergence indicator. 
21 This was a significant problem in the early days of the EMS as the allowable range of exchange 
rate fluctuations was specified in bilateral terms and not in terms of the ACU. It implied that a 
currency might not trigger the divergence indicator even when it was moving by more than the 
(approximate) plus or minus 2 ¼ percent allowable range in the narrow band or the (approximate) 
plus or minus 6 percent range in the wide band. 
22 These cases are illustrated in the scenarios included in Section IV. 
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 (6)). Of course, if all currencies in the basket are at all times at their reference rates in 
terms of the basket there will be no offsetting effects. 
  
The second difficulty arises from the fact that the value of the ACU in terms of 
external currencies is itself influenced by the movements of currencies in the basket. 
In these circumstances, even the movement of a single currency has the potential to bring 
about movements in all currencies’ divergence indicators. This implies—especially in the 
case of any currencies with large weights in the basket—the need to continually take into 
account movements in the value of the basket when assessing exchange rate movements. 
In short, the basket itself is a “moving indicator” and its external value must be monitored 
alongside the divergence indicators.  
 
Finally, a third difficulty arises from the asymmetrical treatment of currencies 
in the basket and the possibility that movements in key exchange rates may be 
obscured. As noted, any differences in weights in the basket imply that currencies are not 
treated symmetrically when their basket-based divergence indicators are calculated. 
Currencies with large weights in the basket will tend to move by less in terms of the ACU 
basket than those with small weights and tend to have smaller divergence indicators in 
terms of magnitude. The reason for this is that large currencies will tend to move the 
basket with them by much more than small currencies. It is not clear, however, why 
currencies should be treated differently in an exchange rate surveillance exercise if the 
intention is to seek to induce greater intra-regional exchange rate stability or 
convergence. Were a case for asymmetrical treatment to be made, it would most likely be 
based on the view that some intra regional exchange rates are more “important” than 
others because, perhaps, they are the rates of “large” countries23. This, however, would 
most likely lead to surveillance paying more attention to these currencies while the 
divergence indicators with weights based on country size would lead to less attention 
                                                 
23 The criteria that would be used to assess importance are not, however, clear and may differ 
according to the shocks hitting the system. Arguably, the currency of a relatively small country 
(the Thai baht) was very important pre Asian crisis but currently the Japanese yen and Chinese 
RMB may be much more important in the case of a US dollar shock. 
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 being paid to these currencies in the divergence indicators24. If it is the intention to treat 
all currencies uniformly in measuring exchange rate divergences, consideration might be 
given either to equal-weight currency baskets or to directly monitoring bilateral intra-
regional exchange rate movements. 
 
An alternative to an ACU-based divergence indicator would be to directly 
monitor bilateral divergences in intra-regional exchange rates25. The use of bilateral 
exchange rate based indicators was the main approach in the EMS after the ECU-based 
divergence indicator. For countries participating in the EMS’s exchange rate mechanism, 
deviations of bilateral exchange rates from bilateral central rates were regularly 
calculated and displayed graphically in a moving band. Such an approach fit well with 
the de jure specification of exchange rate commitments and intervention obligations in 
the EMS in bilateral terms26. In general, bilateral deviations can be calculated relative to 
selected reference exchange rates when there are not formal central rates as in the EMS.  
Effectively, what can be done is that for every period a spread between the strongest (or 
weakest) intra-regional currency can be calculated with all other intra-regional exchange 
rates lying somewhere in the band. Given the use of logarithmic first differences to 
approximate proportional deviations from bilateral central rates in the EMS, positions in 
                                                 
0−Ω
24 One way to reduce the importance of any asymmetries in weights is to divide the divergence 
indicator for any currency by one minus its weight in the currency basket (in the reference period) 
or adjustments can be made to any allowable margins of exchange rate fluctuation. The former 
adjustment gives the set of equations given by:  
{ }130 0 01( / ) / ( / ) ( ) ( / ) / ( / ) /(1 ( ) )T TJS K ACU S K ACU J S K J S K J K=Δ = Ω Δ∑  
The division by (1 - Ω  partially undoes any asymmetry associated with different currency 
weights. The divergences from the ACU in the case of countries with large weights are adjusted 
upward (in absolute value) by a relatively large amount. Divergences from the ACU in the case of 
countries with small weights are adjusted upward by a relatively smaller amount. As a result, the 
ACU-based deviations in the case of currencies with large weights are magnified. Effectively, 
such an approach moves away somewhat from any asymmetrical treatment of currencies and 
produces divergence indicators more similar to those generated by an equal weights index or 
those obtained directly from bilateral divergence indicators (see below). 
(K ) 0 )
25 In principle, bilateral divergences could be monitored either through the recording of bilateral 
exchange rates of intra-regional currencies in terms of an external currency such as the U.S. 
dollar or in terms of each other. The latter approach is considered below.  
26 Within the EMS, the possibility that a country might approach its maximum bilateral exchange 
rate deviation before it crossed its divergence threshold was a potential concern. 
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 the band are independent of the way in which exchange rates are measured and are 
symmetric27. 
  
The bilateral deviation indicators can be displayed graphically. A chart can be 
constructed with deviations in bilateral exchange rates on the vertical axis and time on the 
horizontal axis. By convention, the approach in the EMS was to identify the pair of 
currencies in the exchange rate arrangement with the largest (absolute) bilateral deviation 
(say, currency one and three) in terms of bilateral central rates. A band would then be 
defined (centered around zero) with a width equal to the deviation between these two 
currencies. The top of the band would be associated with the strong currency (say, 
currency one) and the bottom with the weak currency (say, currency three). All other 
currencies in the system would be located at different points within the band by 
considering the deviations in their exchange rates either from the currency at the top of 
the band or the currency at the bottom.  
 
By construction, the bilateral indicator displays the degree of convergence or 
divergence of currencies within a band. Such an approach avoids the potential offset and 
asymmetry ambiguities associated with the use of a currency basket-based approach to 
divergence (discussed above). In addition, it does not directly require the tracking of the 
value of a currency basket in terms of external currencies. In practice, the bilateral 
divergence indicator was used more in the EMS that the ECU-based deviation indicator 
as result of noted difficulties with the basket-based deviation indicator. 
 
 Both the regional basket-based and the bilateral deviations indicator are 
potentially subject to serious N-1 or anchor problems. The problems are related to the 
fact that any dispersion of intra-regional exchange rates can, in principle, be consistent 
with a potentially infinite number of configurations of extra-regional exchange rates. This 
problem does not arise in the case of currency baskets that include both extra and intra 
                                                 
27 Note also that the specification of allowable deviations from bilateral central rates in the EMS 
was also based on logarithmic changes. Hence, for example, the narrow band of allowable 
bilateral exchange rate fluctuations when the system was set up was actually a little different from 
the widely reported plus or minus 2 ¼ percent since it was based on logarithmic approximations. 
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 regional currencies since each regional currency is ultimately linked to the extra-
regional currencies. Mixed extra and intra regional baskets were widely discussed in the 
region for several years in the context of the Basket, Band and Crawl (BBC) approach to 
exchange rate management (see, inter alia, de Brower (2004) and Williamson (2005)) but 
have since been replaced by interest in currency baskets including only regional 
currencies (Ogawa and Shimizu, 2006b)28. For exchange rate surveillance purposes, 
account must be taken not only of intra regional exchange rate movements but also of 
extra-regional exchange rates if one is to determine the “appropriate” policy adjustments 
to “excessive” divergences in intra-regional exchange rates29. 
 
How movements in currencies relative to extra-regional currencies will be 
assessed in a regional currency-basket framework is unclear. Essentially, what is 
required, is either that there be agreement about the appropriate external value of the 
currency basket (the “managed” external exchange rate case) or that there be agreement 
that the external value of the basket will be market determined (the “floating” external 
exchange rate case). In both instances, however, one or more of the countries in the 
currency basket arrangement must be assigned the responsibility to anchor the 
system and act passively vis-a-vis other countries in the basket as regards intra-
regional exchange rates.  
 
For example, in the “managed” external exchange rate case, one or more countries 
must agree to manage their currencies relative to external currencies and not intervene 
vis-à-vis other currencies in the basket. In the “floating” external exchange rate case, one 
or more countries in the basket arrangement must focus monetary policy on internal price 
stability and not intervene vis-à-vis other currencies in the basket. In short, as was 
discovered in the EMS, regional currency basket approaches, in practice, require one or 
more currencies to adopt a passive role in the system vis-a-vis internal currencies. 
                                                 
28 Note that the baskets considered in the earlier approach tended to treat the Japanese yen as a 
currency external to the region together with the U.S. dollar and euro. The Asian currency basket 
approach discussed in the current paper includes the yen in the regional basket. 
29 Hence, for example, in a situation in which the Chinese RMB has appreciated sharply vis-à-vis 
the Japanese yen it is necessary to decide whether it is the RMB that is too strong or the yen too 
weak in order to reach agreement on the appropriate policy responses. 
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 A key difficulty in Asia at the current juncture, of course, is that there is not (as 
there was in the EMS) a natural currency (or pair of currencies) to play such a role. The 
lack of natural anchor currencies not only—together with other considerations-- 
precludes the adoption of formal exchange rate targets in the region but also will cause 
difficulties for surveillance exercises based on regional currency baskets. 
 
III. Historical Behavior of Some Hypothetical ACUs and Divergence Indictors  
 
  This section considers the historical behavior of a number of hypothetical ACUs 
and divergence indicators. In addition, we consider the implications of two alternative 
reference points for assessing the external value of the ACU and the divergence 
indicators. As the official sector has not yet reached agreement on the composition of the 
ACU, there is no guarantee that either of the baskets we consider will correspond to the 
(official) basket (or baskets) that may eventually be created. By considering two 
“extreme” currency baskets, however, we believe we are spanning the likely range of 
possibilities and consideration of these cases allows us to consider qualitatively the 
implications of slightly different weighting schemes. 
  
 The two different currency baskets we consider differ according to the weights 
assigned to different currencies. 
 
o Asymmetrical Currency Basket is one of a number of ASEAN +3 baskets 
constructed by researchers at the Japanese Research Institute of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (RIETI). In this basket, the (fixed) quantities of the thirteen ASEAN + 3 
currencies are set to deliver fixed weights for each currency in the ACU in line with 
the relative sizes of countries over the years 2001-02 as measured by average real 
GDPs (evaluated at PPP exchange rates) and foreign trade (Table I). This index is 
dominated by China, Korea and Japan which account together for almost 75 percent 
of the basket. 
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 o Symmetrical Currency Basket is assumed to include each ASEAN +3 currency 
with equal weight so that the basket is not dominated by any single currency. In such 
a basket, of course, the weight of very small currencies such as that of Lao is identical 
to that of the “giants” of China and Japan.  
  
As regards divergence indicators, we consider the two indicators discussed in the 
previous section: the basket-based divergence indicator (equation (6)) and the bilateral 
deviation indicator30. In order to highlight the importance of the reference point, one set 
of results is backward looking and uses average exchange rates in 2000-01 as the 
reference point31; the other is forward looking and uses hypothetical equilibrium 
exchange rates in the future. The equilibrium exchange rates used were chosen to imply 
significant but different degrees of misalignment of the two large ASEAN + 3 currencies 
relative to the U.S. dollar. The misalignments are assumed to amount to an 
undervaluation of 30 percent in the case of both the Chinese renminbi and the Japanese 
yen while all other currencies are assumed to be in equilibrium. We would obviously not 
want to defend these arbitrary numbers as the intention is only to illustrate that the 
reference values have significant implications for which currencies are identified as 
“convergers” (those shadowing the ACU closely) and those identified as “divergers” 
(those that deviate sharply from the ACU). These “visual" effects would be expected to 
be important if divergence indicators were used for surveillance purposes.  
 
We use logarithmic approximations for the currency basket (as given by equation (1)) 
and the various divergence indicators. The approximations are given below in equations 
(7) and (8) where J and K run from 1, 13 to reflect the thirteen ASEAN + 3 currencies in 
the basket. The logarithmic approximations do not substantially change the conclusions 
that would be reached with raw numbers32. 
                                                 
30 In results available from the authors on request, we also considered the behavior of a weight 
adjusted deviation indicator. Generally, however, the results differed little from the results from 
the basket-based deviation indicator. 
31 This is the reference point used in many studies on the ACU. See, for example, Ogawa and 
Shimizu (2006a). It is not clear, however, that rates were in equilibrium during this period. 
32 Note that logarithmic first differences were used to approximate proportional exchange rate 
changes in the EMS. 
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 (7) lnST ($ /ACU) − lnS0($ /ACU)  = Ω0(J)(lnST ($ /J)
J=1
13∑ − lnS0($ /J))  
(8) 130 0 01ln ( / ) ln ( / ) ( ) (ln ( / ) ln ( / ))T TJS K ACU S K ACU J S K J S K J=− = Ω − 0∑  
     
According to equation (7), the deviation of the U.S. dollar-ACU exchange rate (measured 
as a log difference) is a weighted average of the first difference of logarithms of each 
country’s bilateral exchange rate in terms of the dollar from its reference point. Equation 
(8) indicates that the deviation of each country’s exchange rate from the ACU (measured 
in log differences) is a weighted average of the deviations of the exchange rates between 
currencies in the ACU. The latter, of course, is a logarithmic first-difference 
approximation to the basket-based divergence indicator of (6) in the previous section.  
 
  Before considering the various indicators, it is useful to review the behavior of the 
currencies in the basket. Each exhibit in Figure I displays the value of a component 
currency in terms of the U.S. dollar (measured as the U.S. dollar value of a unit of 
domestic currency) using monthly data from early 2000 through late 2005. Exchange 
rates are indexed to be 100 in January 2000.  As can be seen there is considerable 
diversity of (bilateral US dollar) exchange rate behavior. On the one hand, there are 
currencies such as the Korean won, Thai baht, Japanese yen and Vietnamese dong that 
have shown relatively large in-sample movements vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar in recent 
years. On the other hand, there are currencies such as the Chinese RMB and Malaysian 
ringgit that have shown a relatively high degree of stability. These differences imply, of 
course, that the historical behavior of the ACU will depend on the weights attached to 
“flexible” and “stable” currencies. Baskets that place a very high weight on relative stable 
currencies such as the RMB and ringgit will imply considerable stability of the ACU in 
terms of the U.S. dollar. Baskets that are heavily weighted toward more flexible 
currencies will display much more movement33. 
 
Insert Figure I
                                                 
33 In practice, of course the volatility of any currency basket will depend not only on the volatility 
of its component currencies but also on the covariance among currencies. 
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 Figure II shows the behavior of the ACU (expressed as the US dollar value of an 
ACU) while Figure III depicts the divergence indictors for the two currency baskets we 
are considering. Figure IIIa shows the indicators using 2000-01 exchange rates as the 
reference point (Backward Reference) while Figures IIIb and IIIc are based on 
benchmarking on our hypothetical forward-looking equilibrium exchange rates (Forward 
Reference) for the asymmetric basket and symmetric basket respectively. 
 
Insert Figure II and III
 
Several observations can be made. 
 
(1) The overall behavior of the ACU depends on the weights in the basket. As it is 
dominated by the relatively stable Chinese RMB and by the Japanese Yen, which 
moves little over the sample period, the asymmetric basket display smaller 
movements in terms of the U.S. dollar relative to symmetric basket, which is 
influenced by the higher variability in many of the smaller currencies (see Figure II). 
However, we note that the difference based on historical values is small since the 
component regional currencies are mostly tracking the US dollar (see McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2004)). Nevertheless, the different weighting schemes will have an 
important impact on the external value of ACU should the regional currencies 
become more flexible vis-à-vis the US dollar going forward. 
 
(2) The basket-based divergence indicators behave differently according to whether they 
are derived from the asymmetrical currency basket or from the symmetric basket. 
Generally, both the Chinese RMB and Japanese yen show relatively small basket-
based divergences based on asymmetric basket (see Figure IIIa) unless they are far 
away from their equilibrium values as assumed in the forward-looking reference point 
cases (see Figures IIIb and IIIc). When symmetric currency basket is used (Figure 
IIIc), the divergence indicators for these currencies generally show much more 
movement in divergence indicators than in the asymmetrical basket (Figure IIIb) with 
the reason being that their weights are reduced relative to the first basket. Different 
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 effects occur in the case of the other currencies many of whose weights increase as 
one moves from asymmetric basket to symmetric basket. 
 
(3) To the extent to which some currencies are currently misaligned relative to long-run 
equilibrium, the basket based divergence indicators based on the forward looking 
reference point give a clearer sense of the misalignment than the backward-looking 
indicators. In particular, the forward-looking indicators convey the assumed 
undervaluation of the larger currencies even in the case of the asymmetrical currency 
basket (see Figure IIIb).  
 
 Based on the above, the weighting scheme clearly plays a critical role in 
determining the behavior of the currency basket and the associated divergence indicators. 
In addition, while the reference point potentially plays an important role in benchmarking 
the sign and sizes of basket-based divergence indicators, large asymmetries in weights 
can obscure exchange rate movements. Against this background, a natural question is 
whether there are any criteria that could be specified to determine an optimal set of 
weights when a currency basket is used for surveillance purposes. Unfortunately, the 
answer to this question appears to be in the negative. While, in principle, an optimal set 
of weights might be derived for currency baskets that are intended to serve as a parallel 
currencies—with weights based on seeking to create a currency basket with desirable 
risk, return and liquidity characteristics—no comparable criteria suggest themselves in 
the case of baskets that will be used for surveillance purposes.  
 
IV. Regional Currency Basket and Other Indicators’ Responses to Shocks 
  
 The usefulness of regional currency baskets and the associated divergence 
indicators for surveillance purposes will depend on their behavior in response to shocks 
and the ease with which they can be used to identify the policy requirements for fostering 
greater intra-regional exchange rate stability. This section considers the responses of the 
various currency and divergence indicators to a number of “shocks” and the 
circumstances under which they transmit clear signals for surveillance purposes. As in 
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 the previous sections, we consider basket-based divergence indicators for alternative 
currency baskets and the bilateral deviation indicators. As the behavior of the various 
indicators is considered relative to the baseline (“shock minus control”) it is not 
necessary to take into account alternative benchmark or reference points as in the 
previous section. 
 
 The five sets of scenarios (“shocks”) are intended to illustrate plausible 
perturbations to the baseline that might confront policymakers using the divergence 
indicators for surveillance purposes. The five sets of scenarios are as follows. 
 
o Scenario I. The first set of scenarios deal with the situation of a single “errant” 
currency that moves sharply against all other currencies. In one instance (Scenario 
IA), the errant currency is assumed to be that of a smaller ASEAN country 
(Indonesia) that depreciates by 10 percent against all other currencies.  In the other 
instance (Scenario IB), the errant currency is assumed to be that of a larger “plus 
three” country (Japan) that depreciates by ten percent against all other currencies. As 
noted earlier, currency-basket based divergence indicators tend to transmit their 
clearest signals in instances of a single errant currency. At the same time, however, 
the weight of the errant currency in the currency basket will influence the degree to 
which the currency basket  itself moves and the amount by which basket-based 
divergence indicators change. Bilateral deviation indicators are not, of course, 
influenced by weightings. 
 
o Scenario II. The second scenario involves a uniform depreciation of an external 
currency (here, the US dollar) by 20 percent vis-à-vis all the currencies in the basket. 
By assumption, this scenario involves no movement in intra-regional exchange rates 
and the scenario is expected to produce clear signals. 
  
o Scenario III. The third scenario addresses situations in which there are differential 
movements of all currencies in the basket vis-à-vis the US dollar. Specifically, it is 
assumed that while the Chinese RMB appreciates by 40 percent in terms of the dollar 
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 all the other currencies appreciate by 20 percent. This scenario involves potentially 
significant movements in intra-regional currencies and is intended to illustrate the 
role of the currency basket weights. 
 
o Scenario IV. The fourth scenario involves a situation in which there are several 
errant currencies that differ in the degree to which they depreciate vis-à-vis other 
currencies. In this scenario, the deprecation of the Japanese yen and Korean won are 
each assumed to be 30 percent while the weakening of the Philippine peso and Thai 
baht are assumed to be 15 percent. The scenario is included to demonstrate the role of 
offsetting effects and the possibility that basket-based divergence indicators may miss 
movements of one of the errant currencies. 
 
o Scenario V. The fifth set of scenarios capture situations in which identical 
movements in basket currencies vis-a-vis each other are brought about by very 
different adjustments vis-à-vis external currencies. In scenario VA the currencies of 
Japan, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand appreciate by 10 percent vis-à-
vis the US dollar, currencies other than the Chinese RMB and Malaysian ringgit 
appreciate by 5 percent, and the Chinese RMB and Malaysian ringgit remain stable 
vis-a-vis the US dollar. In scenario VB, the currencies of Japan, Korea, Indonesia, the 
Philippines and Thailand remain stable, all currencies other than China and Malaysia 
depreciate by 5 percent, while the RMB and ringgit depreciate by 10 percent. Both 
scenarios involve, therefore, the Chinese RMB and ringgit depreciating by 10 percent 
relative to the currencies of Japan, Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand and 
by 5 percent against all other currencies. The external value of the basket, however, 
behaves very differently in the two scenarios. 
 
 The key features of the scenarios are displayed in Table II where for each scenario 
we display the behavior of the currency basket, the basket-based deviation indicators and 
the bilateral deviation indicators. All results are presented as deviations from the baseline. 
Several observations can be made about the scenarios. 
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 Insert Table II
  
 The results of scenarios IA and IB confirm that the case of a single errant 
currency is one of the “cleanest” for the basket-based deviation indicators and for the 
currency basket. Both when the errant currency is that of a small country (Scenario IA) 
and a large country (Scenario IB), the various deviation indicators clearly identify the 
currency due to differently sized and signed basket-based deviations. In addition, the fact 
that the deviation indicators for all currencies other than the errant currencies display 
the same movement within each scenario confirms that it is a single currency moving out 
of line34. Reflecting differences in weighting schemes, however, the different currency 
baskets move by different amounts: the movement in the currency basket is largest (in 
absolute value) in the case of the errant currency with the largest weight in the basket. 
Both scenarios also indicate a general feature of the basket-based indicators: even a shock 
to a single currency has the potential to move all the divergence indicators; this is 
especially the case in Scenario IIB when the errant currency has a relatively large weight 
in the currency basket. Among the various indicators, the bilateral deviation indicator 
clearly shows the behavior of the single errant currency vis-à-vis the other currencies in 
the basket.  
 
 Scenario II is based on a uniform movement of an external currency against all 
currencies in the basket; as result, none of measures of intra-regional divergence change. 
The key result in this scenario is that the value of the currency basket moves one for one 
with the external currency as the basket (as noted in Section II) is homogenous of degree 
one in its component currencies. 
 
 The results become considerably less clear when we move to the other scenarios. 
Scenario III is intended to show the effects of a relatively simple form of differential 
currency movement and highlights the role of currency weights. In this scenario, the 
Chinese RMB appreciates by 40 percent and all other currencies are assumed to 
appreciate by 20 percent. In the case of both currency baskets, the divergence indicators 
                                                 
34 This symmetry of the basket based deviation indicator was noted in Section II.  
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 show that the Chinese RMB has strengthened by much more than other currencies. In the 
case of the basket in which China has a large weight, however, the effects are muted in so 
far the RMB moves the basket and the basket appreciates strongly vis-à-vis the US dollar.  
 
 Scenario V illustrates the problem of offsetting effects that can arise when there 
are differential movements in currencies. In this scenario, the deprecation of the Japanese 
yen and Korean won are each assumed to be 30 percent while the weakening of the 
Philippine peso and Thai baht are assumed to be 15 percent. Interestingly, the divergence 
indicators for the peso and the baht show very little movement in the scenario even 
though these currencies have moved substantially against other currencies in the band; on 
the other hand, the divergence indicators for currencies that have not moved in terms of 
the US dollar show large movements. The differential movements of the currencies are 
clearly identified by the bilateral divergence indicator. The behavior of the basket-based 
divergence indicators—and the “dog that didn’t bark” effect—reflects, of course, as 
discussed in section II the fact that the divergence indicators capture deviations from 
average behavior and not measure bilateral deviations. 
 
 The final set of scenarios highlights N-1 problems. In both Scenario VA and VB, 
assumed differences in the behavior of currencies lead to identical basket-based deviation 
indicators even when the currency basket is behaving very differently. For concreteness, 
consider the case of the currency basket dominated by the “plus three” countries. Under 
Scenario VA this basket depreciates vis-à-vis the US dollar while in Scenario VB the 
basket appreciates. At the same time, however, all the intra-regional currencies display 
the same deviations in the two scenarios. The reason for this is that both scenarios (by 
construction) involve the Chinese RMB and Malaysian ringgit depreciating by 5 or 10 
percent against all other intra-regional currencies; they differ only with respect to 
whether the (relative) movement is brought about by the RMB and ringgit 
remaining stable vis-à-vis the US dollar while other intra-regional currencies move 
(Scenario VA), or by these currencies depreciating against the dollar while the other 
intra-regional currencies either appreciate or remain stable in terms of the US 
dollar (Scenario VB). This N-1 problem illustrates why it is not sufficient to focus only 
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 on intra-regional movements to interpret exchange rate behavior. It is necessary either to 
take into account changes in the external value of the currency basket or the movements 
in the external values of currencies must be directly monitored.  
 
V. Conclusions  
 
The key argument of the paper is that regional currency-basket based divergence 
indicators are unlikely to be very helpful for exchange rate surveillance. Using the recent 
behavior of hypothetical regional currency baskets as well as a number of simple 
scenarios, the paper has shown that such indicators are subject to a number of technical 
problems related to the endogenous movement in the currency basket, asymmetries in 
currency weights and offsetting effects, and that they can obscure underlying movements 
in bilateral exchange rates. More fundamentally, a key difficulty for any intra-regional 
exchange rate indicator is the existence of potentially serious N-1 or anchor effects. Some 
of the difficulties can be addressed by bilateral divergence indicators but means will need 
to be found to anchor regional exchange rate surveillance vis-à-vis currencies outside the 
region. Comparable lessons were learnt in Europe over twenty years ago and will need to 
be applied by those calling for a regional currency basket approach to exchange rate 
surveillance.  
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 Table I. Quantities of Component Currencies in Asymmetric Basket35
 
 Trade 
volume* % 
 
 
GDP measured at 
PPP** %  
 
 
Weights % (a) 
 
Benchmark 
exchange 
rate*** (b)  
 
 
Quantities 
(a)/(b)  
Brunei  0.41  0.41  0.41  0.5912  0.0069  
Cambodia  0.19  0.21  0.20  0.0003  7.4235  
China  21.65  47.93  34.79  0.1256  2.7711  
Indonesia  4.67  5.56  5.12  0.0001  452.7871  
Japan  27.31  28.30  27.80  0.0091  30.5681  
South Korea  12.86  6.65  9.76  0.0009  113.1459  
Laos  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.0001  5.9500  
Malaysia  8.85  1.83  5.34  0.2735  0.1953  
Myanmar 0.38  0.38  0.38  0.1598  0.0239  
Philippines  3.12  2.74  2.93  0.0220  1.3347  
Singapore  11.90  0.81  6.36  0.5912  0.1075  
Thailand  6.60  3.56  5.08  0.0246  2.0630  
Vietnam  1.96  1.53  1.74  0.0001  243.0432  
* : The trade volume is calculated as the average of total export and import volumes in 2001,  
2002 and 2003 taken from DOTS (IMF).  
**: GDP measured at PPP is the average of GDP measured at PPP in 2001, 2002 and 2003  
taken from the World Development Report, World Bank. For Brunei and Myanmar, we again  
use the same share of trade volume since no GDP data are available for these countries.  
*** : The Benchmark exchange rate ($-euro/Currency) is the average of the daily exchange  
rate in terms of US$-euro in 2000 and 2001.  
 
 
                                                 
35 Source: Table 2 of Ogawa and Shimizu (2006a) with only slight modifications.  
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 Figure I: Value of Component Currencies in terms of US dollar 
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 Figure I (cont’d) 
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  Figure II: Value of ACU in terms of US dollar for 
Asymmetric and Symmetric Baskets 
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 Figure III: Divergence Indicators 
(a) Asymmetric Basket-based Divergence Indicators
(Backward reference)
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(b) Asymmetric Basket-based Divergence Indicators
 (Forward Reference)
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 (c) Symmetric Basket-based Divergence Indicators
 (Forward Reference)
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 Table II. Asian Currency Basket and Deviation Indicators Under Alternative Scenarios 
(Percentage Point Deviations From Baseline)  
 Scenario IA  Scenario IB  Scenario II  Scenario III
Basket Type Asymmetric  Symmetric   Asymmetric Symmetric  Asymmetric Symmetric  Asymmetric Symmetric 
 -0.52 -0.77  -2.78 -0.77  19.50 20  26.93 21.54 
Basket Deviation Indicators           
Brunei 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Cambodia 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
China 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  13.07 18.46 
Indonesia -9.49 -9.23  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Japan 0.52 0.77  -7.22 -9.23  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Korea 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Laos 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Malaysia 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Myanmar 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Philippines 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Singapore 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Thailand 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Vietnam 0.52 0.77  2.78 0.77  0 0  -6.93 -1.54 
Bilateral Deviation Indicators        
0
   
0Brunei 10  10     
Cambodia 10  10  0 0
0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
   
China 10  10    20 
Indonesia 0  10     
Japan 10  0     
Korea 10  10     
Laos 10  10     
Malaysia 10  10     
Myanmar 10  10     
Philippines 10  10     
Singapore 10  10     
Thailand 10  10     
Vietnam 10  10     
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 Table II (cont’d) 
 Scenario IV  Scenario VA  Scenario VB
Basket Type Asymmetric  Symmetric   Asymmetric Symmetric  Asymmetric Symmetric 
ACU -12.52 -6.93  5.55 6.16  -4.45 -3.85 
Basket Deviation Indicators        
Brunei 12.52 6.93  -0.55 -1.16  -0.55 -1.16 
Cambodia 12.52 6.93  -0.55 -1.16  -0.55 -1.16 
China 12.52 6.93  -5.55 -6.16  -5.55 -6.16 
Indonesia 12.52 6.93  4.45 3.85  4.45 3.85 
Japan -17.48 -23.07  4.45 3.85  4.45 3.85 
Korea -17.48 -23.07  4.45 3.85  4.45 3.85 
Laos 12.52 6.93  -0.55 -1.16  -0.55 -1.16 
Malaysia 12.52 6.93  -5.55 -6.16  -5.55 -6.16 
Myanmar 12.52 6.93  -0.55 -1.16  -0.55 -1.16 
Philippines -2.48 -8.07  4.45 3.85  4.45 3.85 
Singapore 12.52 6.93  -0.55 -1.16  -0.55 -1.16 
Thailand -2.48 -8.07  4.45 3.85  4.45 3.85 
Vietnam 12.52 6.93  -0.55 -1.16  -0.55 -1.16 
Bilateral Deviation Indicators        
5Brunei 30  5   
Cambodia 30  5  5
0
5
0
5
5
5
 
China 30  0   
Indonesia 30  10  10 
Japan 0  10  10 
Korea 0  10  10 
Laos 30  5   
Malaysia 30  0   
Myanmar 30  5   
Philippines 15  10  10 
Singapore 30  5   
Thailand 15  10  10 
Vietnam 30  5   
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